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The U.S. Border Patrol’s Constitutional
Erosion in the “100-Mile Zone”
Deborah Anthony*
ABSTRACT
Supreme Court jurisprudence has established that some established
constitutional provisions do not apply at the U.S. border, and protections
against governmental privacy incursions are significantly reduced. As
such, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the U.S. Border
Patrol as an arm of CBP have more authority to search, seize, and detain
individuals and property at border crossings than law enforcement
agencies would have in other contexts. Justified by reference to the
national interest in monitoring and controlling entrants to the country, the
doctrine is known as the “border search exception.”
However, Border Patrol does not restrict its operations to the U.S.
border. Originating in a decades-old federal statute, CBP has the authority
to conduct stops and searches within a “reasonable distance” of a border,
defined by regulation as 100 miles. This “100-mile zone” has been used
for permanent and temporary internal checkpoints and roving stops. The
extent to which the agency’s assumed expansive authority within this zone
squares with constitutional principles is open to question. This Article will
analyze how Fourth Amendment principles should apply to CBP authority
inside national borders, including its authority to stop, question, search,
and detain individuals. It will analyze the legal problems and risks
attendant to an expansion of Border Patrol authority into an area
encompassing the residence of about two-thirds of the U.S. population,
suggesting an alternative approach that provides both clearer guidelines
and more robust protections for civil liberties. Ultimately, Border Patrol
activity that occurs beyond the nation’s border should be bound by
ordinary constitutional restrictions applicable to all other law enforcement.

*Associate Professor of Legal Studies, University of Illinois Springfield.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Border Patrol is an arm of the federal Customs and
Border Protection Agency (CBP), housed within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). It was created by regulation to enforce the
border control provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
CBP is the largest law enforcement agency in the country and is tasked
with monitoring and enforcing border security, customs, trade, agriculture,
and immigration at over 300 ports of entry. Border Patrol is tasked with
“securing our international land borders and coastal waters between ports
of entry.”1
However, Border Patrol does not limit its operations exclusively to
the U.S. border and to those who are in the process of entering the U.S.
Instead, asserting authority well beyond that area, Border Patrol routinely
stops, questions, searches, and seizes individuals who are not crossing the
border (and perhaps have never done so at all). In fact, these individuals
may be hundreds of miles away from the border when interacting with
Border Patrol. The extent of these interior operations appears to be
expansive but secretive, the scope of which, therefore, cannot be fully
known. Although available evidence indicates that internal Border Patrol
operations have been increasing, the agency has been resistant to reporting
relevant data and information necessary to provide a thorough
understanding of the situation.2 The constitutional implications of these
1. What
We
Do,
U.S.
CUSTOMS
&
BORDER
PROTECTION,
https://www.cbp.gov/careers/usbp-what-we-do (last modified Mar. 29, 2019).
2. See discussion infra Part II and Sections IV.A., C.
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operations, and the extent to which Border Patrol activities violate the
rights of those they encounter, is the subject of much debate. Many
troubling accounts exist of Border Patrol abuses, including unlawful
searches, seizures, detentions, use of excessive force, and a consistent lack
of oversight and accountability in response to such abuses, from the lowest
to the highest levels of agency authority.3 Evidence suggests that Border
Patrol agents largely act with impunity, and disciplinary action for even
the most egregious abuses is nonexistent.4 Thus, there is little incentive to
operate within either constitutional constraints or agency guidelines.
This Article will analyze the current jurisprudential and statutory
guidelines for Border Patrol activity and whether they comport with
reasonable constitutional limits. It will also address the ways those
guidelines are ignored in practice, raising additional concerns about the
dilution and disregard of constitutional rights. Further, this Article argues
that both the practices and legal framework of current Border Patrol
authority are of dubious constitutional validity, and that Border Patrol
activity occurring anywhere other than at the nation’s border should be
bound by ordinary constitutional restrictions applicable to all other law
enforcement.
II.

CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL HISTORY AND OPERATIONS

The U.S. Border Patrol began as a formal federal government agency
in 1924 and was merged into the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) in 1933.5 Initially, the primary focus of the agency was to secure the
Canadian border, but immigrants and Americans of Mexican descent
increasingly became the target of government focus in the 1930s. During
that decade, mass deportations saw 500,000 people “dumped across the
border in Mexico.”6 In 1954 the agency stepped up its efforts at the
southern border in what was officially termed “Operation Wetback,”7
which led to the deportation of thousands of individuals of Mexican
descent.8 Border-securing operations, however, were not a serious

3. See discussion infra Part II and Sections IV.A., C.
4. See discussion infra Part II and Sections IV.A., C.
5. Timeline, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://bit.ly/38TT2Vm
(last visited Dec. 29, 2019) [hereinafter CBP Timeline].
6. Nancy Cervantes et al., Hate Unleashed: Los Angeles in the Aftermath of
Proposition 187, 17 CHICANO-LATINOCHICANA/O LATINA/O L. REV. 1, 3 (1995) (citing
FRANCISCO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRIGUEZ, DECADE OF BETRAYAL: MEXICAN
REPATRIATION IN THE 1930S, at 23 (1995)) (indicating that over 51,000 people were
deported in California alone as a result of this operation).
7. Id.; see also CBP Timeline, supra note 5.
8. Cervantes, et al., supra note 6, at 3 (indicating that over 51,000 people were
deported in California alone as a result of this operation) (citing Juan Ramon Garcia,
OPERATION WETBACK: THE MASS DEPORTATION OF MEXICAN UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS
IN 1954 200, 230–31 (1980)).
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government priority until the 1990s.9 At the beginning of the Clinton
administration in 1993, Border Patrol had 4,000 agents. But in 2001, this
number had more than doubled to 9,800.10
After the 9/11 attacks, Border Patrol structure and operations
changed quickly and significantly. Congress gave new attention to border
security, and there was a massive push to increase the ranks well beyond
the nearly 10,000 agents employed at that time and to fund the agency
more adequately. The INS was disbanded, and its operations were moved
from the Department of Justice to the newly-created DHS, comprising
three new agencies: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS), and CBP. By 2016, Border
Patrol had swelled to about 21,000 agents. President Trump has said he
wants to continue to increase that number by another 5,000,11 and that
increase appears to be in process.12
From a non-government perspective, the country appeared to be
doing exactly what needed to be done to address border security problems
that were at the forefront of public attention after the 9/11 attacks.
Certainly, increased appropriations to address border security would
appear sensible. However, there were significant internal concerns about
the process by which it took place. W. Ralph Basham, the new CBP
commissioner in 2005, expressed serious reservations about the push for
such rapid growth. He believed such quick expansion prevented the
opportunity to carefully plan and selectively hire agents to work in what
he termed a “tough environment.”13 Nevertheless, the Bush administration
and Congress pushed ahead, allocating millions of dollars in funding under
the view that “[a]lmost any body in the field was better than no body.”14
Gil Kerlikowske, the CBP commissioner under President Obama, noted
the inevitable problems with such swift staffing increases, stating that
“[l]aw enforcement always regrets hiring quickly.”15 James Wong, a
retired senior CBP internal affairs official, also shared concerns about the
diminished quality of agents resulting from such a fast increase in the
9. See Border Patrol History, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION,
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/history (last modified Oct. 5, 2018)
(discussing multiple operations beginning in 1993, the creation of new units, and a “defined
national strategic plan” for the future of the agency).
10. U.S. BORDER PATROL, BORDER PATROL AGENT NATIONWIDE STAFFING BY FISCAL
YEAR (2019), https://bit.ly/3bTUj0A
11. Brian Naylor, Trump’s Plan to Hire 15,000 Border Patrol and ICE Agents Won’t
be Easy, NPR (Feb. 23, 2017, 5:12 AM), https://n.pr/2mHzz7n.
12. U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 27 (2019),
https://bit.ly/2tmtiNY.
13. Garrett M. Graff, The Green Monster: How the Border Patrol Became America’s
Most Out-of-Control Law Enforcement Agency, POLITICO MAG., Nov.–Dec. 2014, at 1, 3,
available at https://politi.co/2mkdpYF.
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 7.
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ranks during the post-9/11 push: “[a]t some point, it became more
important to have people in the seats than it was to have qualified people
in the seats,”16 and as could be expected, the level of experience of agents
declined.17 In an effort to recruit more people, CBP spent millions on
advertising,18 while DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner said the
necessary management and training systems were not built to
accommodate the hiring surge.19 As a result, agents were put into the field
without full background checks, and some were promoted as supervisors
and trainers with little experience.20 It turned out that some of those hired
were gang members and drug cartel members, according to CBP
Commissioner Basham.21 CBP officials themselves estimated that
employee integrity problems likely existed and warranted removal of a
stunning 10-20% of their entire agent force.22 Making matters even worse,
leadership also acknowledged an internal culture of not reporting
misconduct.23
The influx of new agents brought with it a surge in complaints,
including claims of excessive force.24 Misconduct arrests (not complaints)
of CBP officers or agents averaged nearly one per day every day for seven
years between 2005 and 2012.25 In just five years between 2007 and 2012,
there were about 1,700 claims of excessive force, although exact numbers
are difficult to ascertain due to inadequate record-keeping.26 The American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) found 2,178 complaints of misconduct
from January 2012 to October 2015, with physical abuse being the most
common complaint, at 59% of the total.27 Agency officials expressed
concern about the rise in “disturbing events” and employee arrests.28
Although such concern prompted multiple high-level warnings and
requests for action, bureaucratic and other issues, turf battles, lack of
investigatory authority of CBP internal affairs, and inertia made these
issues nearly impossible to address.29 Similarly, the hiring surge,
insufficient training, and misconduct of newly hired agents no doubt had
16. Id.
17. DANIEL E. MARTINEZ ET AL., NO ACTION TAKEN: LACK OF CBP ACCOUNTABILITY
IN RESPONDING TO COMPLAINTS OF ABUSE 2 (2014), http://bit.ly/2lXSlqt.
18. See Graff, supra note 13, at 3.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 3–4.
21. Id. at 4.
22. See id. at 5.
23. See id. at 4.
24. See id.
25. There were 2,170 misconduct arrests in total between 2005 and 2012. See id.
26. See id. at 5.
27. GUILLERMO CANTOR & WALTER EWING, STILL NO ACTION TAKEN: COMPLAINTS
AGAINST BORDER PATROL AGENTS CONTINUE TO GO UNANSWERED 7–8 (2017),
http://bit.ly/2kfiL6G.
28. Graff, supra note 13, at 4.
29. See id. at 4–5.
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a significant impact on the current state of affairs with CBP, including the
agency’s apparent unwillingness and inability to ensure constitutional
safeguards in carrying out its duties.
III. OVERVIEW OF CUSTOMS AND BORDER PATROL LEGAL AUTHORITY
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . . .”30 In effect, this means
that before conducting a search of a person or her belongings, law
enforcement officers must first obtain a warrant from a judge, based on
probable cause that evidence of a crime will be found. Failing to do so runs
afoul of the Constitution and violates the rights of the individual.
A.

Authority at the International Borders and Border
Equivalents

While ordinary state and federal law enforcement officers can make
use of some judicially-expounded exceptions or limitations to this
requirement under some specific circumstances, the Border Patrol has
been treated somewhat differently when it comes to constitutional
boundaries. In cases testing the Fourth Amendment limits of Border
Patrol’s authority to conduct warrantless searches of those entering the
country at ports of entry (including functional border equivalents, such as
international airports), the courts have used a balancing test whereby the
Fourth Amendment privacy rights of entrants are weighed against the
sovereign’s security interests at the border.31 The Supreme Court has
decided that there is a reduced expectation of privacy at the border, holding
that the government’s interest in monitoring and controlling entrants
outweighs the privacy interest of the individual. Thus, routine searches
without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion are considered
inherently reasonable and automatically justified in that particular
context.32 Fourth Amendment rights are therefore significantly
circumscribed at the border, and CBP is given an expansive authority to
randomly—and without suspicion—search, seize, and detain individuals
and property at border crossings that law enforcement officers would not
have in other circumstances.
Although nothing in the Fourth Amendment (or Constitution
generally) provides for such a principle, this doctrine has become known
as the “border search exception” to the warrant requirement of the Fourth

30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
31. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272–73 (1973).
32. Id.
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Amendment.33 The precise limits to this exception are disputed and
continue to be tested, as the Border Patrol has engaged in searches not only
of suitcases and bags but also increasingly of electronic devices such as
cell phones and laptops, sometimes confiscating them without cause.34
Agents have also detained entrants for long periods of time without an
apparent or stated reason,35 even engaging in invasive body searches with
no legal justification.36 There have been recent calls for the Border Patrol
to publicize its policies and justifications, and numerous complaints have
challenged these practices and their constitutionality.37 The Fourth Circuit
recently came down with some guiding principles regarding cell phone
searches,38 but the general standards are disputed, inconsistently applied,
and in a state of flux.39 The Supreme Court has not taken a recent case
dealing with these issues. What the Court has made clear, however, is that
the border search exception applies only to the narrow purpose of
enforcing immigration and customs laws, which entails ensuring that
required duties are paid on imported goods and that harmful goods and
people do not enter the country.40 Other potential government interests—
including general crime control—may not be effectuated via the border
search exception.
B.

Authority Within the Border

The authority of Border Patrol and the rights of individuals at
locations other than at the national border and international ports of entry
are not only less clear than they are at the border, but are also much more
controversial. Where CBP is responsible for facilitating trade, customs,
and immigration laws and regulations at the border,41 Immigration and
33. See, e.g., D.E. v. John Doe, 834 F.3d 723, 727 (6th Cir. 2016).
34. See Esha Bhandari, The Government’s New Policy on Device Searches at the
Border: What You Need to Know, ACLU (Jan. 9, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://bit.ly/2l9mwer
(noting that searches of electronic devices rose by about 60% from 2016 to 2017).
35. See Sophia Cope, Law Enforcement Uses Border Search Exception as Fourth
Amendment Loophole, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 8, 2016), https://bit.ly/2hgJzxF.
36. See Susan Ferriss, In Horrifying Detail, Women Accuse U.S. Customs Officers of
Invasive Body Searches, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2018), https://wapo.st/2kD6V6O.
37. See, e.g., Bhandari, supra note 34 (noting that in January 2018 CBP issued a new
policy against “advanced” searches of electronic devices with suspicion of wrongdoing,
but that “basic” searches, which reveal items located on the phone without a download, are
permissible with no suspicion).
38. United States v. Kolsuz, 890 F.3d 133, 143–44 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that the
search of a cell phone is not considered part of a “routine” border search and must be based
on at least reasonable suspicion).
39. See, e.g., Esha Bhandari et al., Can Border Agents Search Your Electronic
Devices? It’s Complicated, ACLU (Mar. 14, 2017, 10:45 AM), https://bit.ly/2pQXwYz.
40. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880–84 (1975); see also
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566–67 (1976).
41. About CBP, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://www.cbp.gov/about
(last modified Sept. 18, 2018) (“CBP takes a comprehensive approach to border
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Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the agency tasked with enforcing
immigration laws within the country, including the apprehension,
prosecution, and deportation of undocumented individuals.42 Yet CBP
regularly asserts authority well beyond the border, moving into ICE
immigration enforcement territory. Border Patrol agents routinely stop,
question, search, and seize individuals who are not crossing the border
(and perhaps have never done so at all), and may, in fact, be hundreds of
miles away from it when interacting with CBP.
The statute apparently supporting Border Patrol’s authority within
the border provides agents the authority to “board and search for aliens”
on any “aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle” within a “reasonable distance
from any external boundary of the United States.”43 This language appears
to come from a change to the INA in 1946.44 The statute does not define
“reasonable distance,” so a federal regulation implementing the change
was written in 1953 establishing the reasonable distance as 100 air miles
from any external boundary, including all coasts and waterways.45 The
same regulation also authorizes CBP to enter private property, other than
residences, within 25 miles of the border without a warrant. There appears
to have been little deliberation on either the statute or the regulation, and
it is unclear why 100 miles was the distance chosen.46 The regulation also
provides exceptions to the 100-mile rule whereby the Commissioner of
CBP or the Assistant Secretary for ICE may declare a larger distance to be
“reasonable” on a case-by-case basis.47 Although the language states that
such exceptions should take place only under unusual circumstances,
evidence suggests that there exists within CBP a presumption of
reasonableness for operations further than 100 miles from a boundary.48

management and control, combining customs, immigration, border security and
agricultural protection . . . .”).
42. What
We
Do,
U.S.
IMMIGR.
&
CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/overview (last modified Dec. 4, 2018) (“Immigration enforcement is
the largest single area of responsibility for ERO [Enforcement and Removal Operations]
. . . [and] the majority of its immigration enforcement mission takes place in the interior of
the country.”).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (a)(3) (2012).
44. Act of Aug. 7, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-613, 60 Stat. 865 (1946).
45. Definitions, 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a) (2019).
46. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION’S (CBP’S)
100-MILE RULE 2 n.4 (2014), https://bit.ly/2kJjAVT [hereinafter 100-Mile Rule] (first
citing H.R. REP. NO. 79-186 (1945); and then citing S. REP. NO. 79-632 (1945)).
47. 8 C.F.R. §287.1(a)(2), (b) (2019).
48. See United States v. Lamas, 608 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1979) (involving a stop
190 miles from the border); see also United States v. Cervantes, 797 F.3d 326, 330 (5th
Cir. 2015) (involving a stop 200 miles from the border); JAMES LYALL ET AL., RECORD OF
ABUSE: LAWLESSNESS AND IMPUNITY IN BORDER PATROL’S INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT
OPERATIONS 6 (2015), https://bit.ly/2lPjy9j (discussing a stop 125 miles from the border);
David Anton Armendariz, On the Border Patrol and its Use of Illegal Roving Patrol Stops,
14 SCHOLAR 553, 559 (2012) (discussing a stop 190 miles from the border).
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The effects of this regulation are sweeping. Because “external
boundary” has been interpreted by CBP to include oceans and all other
waterways, regardless of how unlikely it might be that undocumented
individuals will arrive via that route, the entire eastern seaboard is covered
(including Washington, D.C., New York City, Philadelphia, and Boston),
as well as most of California (including San Diego, Los Angeles, San
Francisco, and Sacramento), the most highly populated areas of Oregon
and Washington (including Portland and Seattle), the entire states of
Florida and Michigan, many of the northeastern states, and most of the
nation’s other large cities (including Chicago, Detroit, Houston, and New
Orleans).49 For instance, the shortest drive from Chicago to the Canadian
border is approximately 280 miles, or 248 air miles.50 Although Chicago
is well beyond the 100-mile limit for CBP activity, the entire city (and 100
miles southward into Illinois) are all subject to extended Border Patrol
enforcement authority and the “border search exception” because Chicago
is adjacent to Lake Michigan, which is considered an “external boundary.”
The implications of such wide authority are sweeping, especially in light
of the fact that approximately 200 million people—over 65% of the U.S.
population,51 and 75% of its Hispanic population52—live within the “100mile zone.”
IV. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND INTERNAL CBP ENFORCEMENT
ACTIVITY IN PRACTICE
Constitutional considerations regarding Border Patrol enforcement
activities are dependent upon the location at which those activities take
place. Although Supreme Court jurisprudence dictates that constitutional
rights are circumscribed at the border and ports of entry, the same is not
the case at other locations within the U.S.
A.

Interior Checkpoints and the Border Search Exception

In addition to its regular operations at the border and ports of entry,
CBP operates approximately 32 permanent “interior border checkpoints”
throughout the country, along with another 39 temporary internal or

49. See, e.g., KNOW YOUR RIGHTS: 100 MILE BORDER ZONE, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/know-your-rights/border-zone/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2019).
50. How Far is it Between, FREE MAP TOOLS, https://www.freemaptools.com/howfar-is-it-between-chicago-and-windsor_-ontario.htm (last visited Dec. 29, 2019)
[hereinafter Distance Calculator] (calculating the distance between Chicago, IL and
Windsor, ON, CA).
51. 100-Mile Rule, supra note 46, at 1.
52. Tanvi Misra, Inside the Massive U.S. “Border Zone,” CITYLAB (May 14, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2k1D0kt.
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“tactical” checkpoints.53 In the Tucson sector,54 in 2003, temporary
checkpoints were mandated to be moved every seven days,55 then an
“average” of every 14 days in 2005,56 but information about other sectors
and specifics about the frequency of movement is difficult to come by.
Border Patrol has refused to disclose how many of these temporary
checkpoints exist; however, reports place the number at about 170.57 In
Texas, the permanent Falfurrias border checkpoint is 70 miles north of the
border on US 281, the main route connecting the southern McAllen area
to other cities such as Houston, Austin, and San Antonio. Seventeen other
checkpoints exist throughout Texas, with others in New Mexico, Arizona,
and California.58 Every traveler heading away from the border on the
highways where these checkpoints exist is required to stop and answer
questions about their citizenship or legal status, without ever having left
or re-entered the country. Some of these travelers are subjected to
considerably more than a brief inquiry, including extensive questioning,
detention, canine searches, and agent searches of persons and vehicles.59
The basis for these activities is not always clear (and is sometimes quite
suspect).
While the checkpoints can pose a nuisance to the occasional traveler,
there are more severe consequences for local residents of the area who
must engage with CBP regularly in their daily lives by traveling through
checkpoints to reach school, work, shopping, or other regular activities, all
without ever having crossed any border. At best, the checkpoints pose a
time delay, and vehicle back-ups can sometimes make this extreme,
particularly when added up over the course of days, weeks, and months of
regular travel. At worst, many residents are required to regularly provide
proof of citizenship or legal residence and may be subject to search and
detention on multiple occasions, with evidence suggesting that these
extended detentions, searches, and questioning are significantly more
53. As of fiscal year 2008. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., Border Patrol
checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol’s Mission, but More Consistent Data Collection
and Performance Measurement Could Improve Effectiveness 8, 34 n.44 (2009),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09824.pdf (stating that there are 71 total checkpoints,
and 39 of them are tactical).
54. For a listing of Border Patrol Sectors, including specific stations within each
sector, see Border Patrol Sectors, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION,
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/border-patrol-sectors.
55. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-05-435, Border Patrol: Available Data
on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector Performance 24 (2005),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05435.pdf.
56. Id. at 25.
57. Bob Ortega, Border Patrol Sued for Harassing at Arivaca Checkpoint,
AZCENTRAL (Nov. 26, 2014, 11:08 PM), https://bit.ly/2m2N9C4.
58. David Branham, Sr., The Influence of Seclusion: Immigration and Border
Security Attitudes of Registered Voters Living Behind the Interior Border Patrol
Checkpoints in the State of Texas, 16 MIDSOUTH POL. SCI. REV. 1, 1 (2015).
59. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 1.
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common for Hispanic residents.60 Even former Arizona governor Raul
Castro—at 96 years old—was detained and required to stand in 100degree heat for more than 30 minutes at a checkpoint.61 Checkpoint
detentions can sometimes last for hours.62 Even when no wrongdoing is
found, residents are nevertheless subject to delays, privacy violations,
embarrassment, and even property damage.63 This creates an entire region
of the country where legal residents and citizens are accorded less privacy
and more invasive government monitoring as a matter of course than those
further inland. Although Border Patrol activity is more intensive in the
southern region of the country, it has greatly expanded in recent years in
other areas as well, particularly in the northern U.S. region.64 It is
undisputed, even by Border Patrol, that such stops amount to a seizure by
Fourth Amendment standards, but the agency nevertheless claims the right
to “temporarily seize all vehicles that drive up to an immigration
checkpoint . . . to conduct an immigration inspection,” according to a CBP
spokesperson.65 This 100-mile border region has consequently been
termed the “band of isolation,”66 a “no man’s land”67 where local residents
perpetually live with diminished rights and constant government intrusion
and suspicion in their lives. By virtue of its practices in the region, the
Border Patrol has been referred to as “part police force, part occupying
army, part frontier cavalry.”68 Patrick Eddington, a policy analyst with the
CATO Institute, has referred to this 100-mile band around the country area
as a “Constitution-free zone” where Border Patrol is “allowed to nullify
people’s rights.”69
Border Patrol asserts that these checkpoints are necessary to
effectively secure the border against “illegal aliens” and “illegal
narcotics.”70 Indeed, the strong government interest in those matters is
precisely the justification for the Court’s decision that permitted the border
60. See, e.g., Ron Nixon, Under Trump, Border Patrol Steps Up Searches Far From
the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2CArHqg; Jay Skebba, Border
Patrol checks on Greyhound buses raise eyebrows, BLADE (Sept. 23, 2018, 9:06 PM),
http://bit.ly/2kOtJjX.
61. Todd Miller, The US-Mexico Border: Where the Constitution Goes to Die,
MOTHER JONES (July 15, 2014), https://bit.ly/2mjXqcT.
62. See, e.g., Mona Kosar Abdi, Ohio Woman woman detained by Border Patrol
agents, wrongfully accused of “Smugglingalien smuggling,” RTV6 INDIANAPOLIS (Oct.
13, 2018, 4:58 PM), https://bit.ly/2kQj1tg.
63. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 2.
64. See infra Section IV.C.
65. Misra, supra note 52.
66. Branham, Sr., supra note 58, at 2.
67. Misra, supra note 52.
68. Graff, supra note 13, at 1.
69. Misra, supra note 52.
70. Border Patrol Overview, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION,
https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/overview (last modified Apr. 26,
2018).
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search exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment in
the first place. Border Patrol claims, however, that those needs extend
beyond the border into the interior as well. Yet, constitutional issues aside,
a number of facts call that claim into question. These checkpoints often
result in the arrest of U.S. citizens (who by definition are legally present
in the U.S.), and at significantly higher levels than non-citizens.71 One
checkpoint 75 miles inside the border in the Yuma, Arizona sector
reported in a three year period just one non-citizen immigration
apprehension.72 But the checkpoint received multiple civil rights
complaints in the same time frame.73 In all of 2013, nine out of 23
checkpoints in the Tucson sector did not arrest a single “deportable
subject.”74 The Yuma sector, in fact, arrested eight times as many citizens
as non-citizens in 2013, and eleven times as many in 2011.75 Further, those
arrests were primarily for drug violations76 and not immigration violations,
as all citizens are legally present in the country.
There are many indications that operations at these checkpoints often
involve racial profiling as well as Fourth Amendment violations in the
form of unreasonable searches and detentions without a warrant, probable
cause, or reasonable suspicion. For example, at one checkpoint, evidence
suggested that Latinos were twenty times more likely to be detained than
non-Latinos.77 Additionally, CBP arrest records from Rochester, New
York bus terminals and railway stations show that of the 2,776 arrests
between 2005 and 2009, just 0.9% of those arrested had a fair
complexion.78 Reports of Border Patrol operations have resulted in
concerns about the use of “racial and ethnic profiling techniques to
determine who to stop, question or arrest.”79 Passengers aboard commuter
buses and trains boarded by Border Patrol agents often report that only the
non-white passengers are targeted.80 A class action lawsuit was filed
against CBP for regularly stopping vehicles in Washington state and
interrogating individuals without any legal justification, based solely on

71. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 3.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 14.
75. Id.
76. For example, “four out of five drug-related arrests by Border Patrol involved U.S.
citizens.” Id.
77. Imelda Mejia, Border Patrol Check: Some Arivaca Residents Want Checkpoint
Gone, CRONKITE NEWS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://bit.ly/2kAKlvz.
78. Miller, supra note 61.
79. N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, JUSTICE DERAILED: WHAT RAIDS ON NEW YORK’S
TRAINS AND BUSES REVEAL ABOUT BORDER PATROL’S INTERIOR ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES
26 (2011), http://bit.ly/2mmi3W4 [hereinafter N.Y.C.L.U.]; see also Armendariz, supra
note 48, at 556–58.
80. Nixon, supra note 60.
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race and ethnicity.81 CBP settled that suit and agreed to require additional
training for agents.82 When the Department of Justice banned racial
profiling by federal law enforcement in 2014, CBP lobbied for—and
received—an exemption to the requirement.83 Additional questioning was
met with reticence, but one official anonymously indicated that race and
nationality “could be factors” in official enforcement activity.84
Individuals detained at checkpoints beyond brief questioning about
immigration status report troubling experiences. Checkpoint detentions
have been reported to last anywhere from minutes85 to hours86 to days.87
People report being told they were detained at checkpoints for reasons as
questionable as their car smelling like a skunk or because they had
prescription medications.88 Three humanitarian aid workers were detained
because they had backpacks, which an agent said was inherently
suspicious.89 Another was not only detained but threatened with a weapon
because the agent “didn’t recognize” him.90 A number of individuals had
their property damaged by agents, with no restitution provided.91 Motorists
with damaged property are often told to file a lawsuit to obtain
reimbursement, but if they attempt to do so, they are told by CBP that the
law does not permit them to receive reimbursement for property damage
caused by CBP employees.92
81. Sanchez v. U.S. Office of Border Patrol, No. 12-5378 BHS, 2012 WL 3715719,
at *1–2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2012).
82. Settlement Agreement at 3, Sanchez v. U.S. Office of Border Patrol, No. 12-5378
BHS, 2012 WL 3715719 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2012), available at
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-WA-0018-0005.pdf.
83. Sari Horwitz & Jerry Markon, Racial Profiling will still be allowed at airports,
along border despite new policy, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2014), https://wapo.st/355r9Hk.
84. Daniel Denvir, Curbing the Unchecked Power of the U.S. Border Patrol, CITYLAB
(Oct. 30, 2015), https://bit.ly/2Mz6s05
85. See, e.g., N.Y.C.L.U., supra note 79, at 22 (45 minute detention); Letter from
James Lyall, Staff Att’y, ACLU of Ariz., to Charles K. Edwards, Deputy Inspector Gen.,
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., and Tamara Kessler, Officer for Civil Rights & Liberties, Dep’t
of Homeland Sec. 5–11 (Jan. 15, 2014), available at https://bit.ly/2mcGANi [hereinafter
Lyall Letter] (describing multiple detentions lasting 10–45 minutes).
86. See N.Y.C.L.U., supra note 79, at 6 (detentions lasting “hours” and “a few hours”);
see also Lyall Letter, supra note 85, at 3, 7 (describing detentions lasting “over an hour”).
87. See N.Y.C.L.U., supra note 79, at 7, 20, 22 (detentions lasting “several days”).
88. Lyall Letter, supra note 85, at 7.
89. Id. at 4.
90. Id. at 7.
91. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 5.
92. Id. This is something of a misrepresentation of the law, however. Technically,
CBP is liable for damages resulting from its negligence. See Kisak v. United States, 465
U.S. 848, 862 (1984). However, damage resulting from the inspection of goods is not
generally considered negligence and, in practice, CBP has largely been held immune from
damage or destruction caused during inspection of goods, even from activities such as
drilling holes into goods. See Kevin G. Hall, When Damage Occurs, Don’t Bill Customs,
JOC (Sept. 1, 1999, 8:00 PM), https://www.joc.com/when-damage-occurs-dont-billcustoms_19990901.html.
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Numerous allegations have stated that agents claim a canine alert as
a basis for conducting a search, resulting in detention and searches of
individuals and vehicles that often turn up nothing.93 Some claims of
canine alerts have taken place when an agent suggested the dog had
changed its “breathing pattern,”94 or even when there were no dogs in the
area.95 One canine “alert” resulted in a U.S. citizen being forcibly stripsearched, subjected to genital and cavity searches and a forced bowel
movement, along with X-rays and CT-scans, all of which revealed no
illegal activity.96 The reliability of canine alerts has been called into
question in multiple cases. The dissent in the Seventh Circuit Doe v.
Renfrow case, for example, pointed out that 35 alerts out of 50 were, in
fact, false.97 Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Merrett v. Moore noted that
narcotics were not found in a staggering 27 out of 28 canine alerts at a
temporary checkpoint.98 Nevertheless, courts have continued to accept
canine alerts in establishing probable cause for detention and searches,
without any particular requirements for training, certification, or
documentation of reliability in the field.99 This remains so even in the face
of evidence indicating that the rate of accurate alerts is as low as 7%, with
the highest canine accuracy rate in that study at 56%—just over half the
time100—with a false alert average of 74% or more.101 A positive alert,
therefore, was three times more likely to be false than accurate.102 A more
recent study resulted in a false alert rate of about 80%.103
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that immigration checkpoints are
permissible, but only insofar as they involve a minimally intrusive “brief
detention of travelers” with a “routine and limited inquiry into residence

93. See, e.g., LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 1–2, 5 (reporting at least 44 instances of
false canine alerts that resulted in detentions and/or searches); see also Lyall Letter, supra
note 85, at 1 n.2.
94. Lyall Letter, supra note 85, at 13 n.26.
95. Id. at 8.
96. See id. at 1 n.2.
97. Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 94–95 (7th Cir. 1980) (Fairchild, C.J., dissenting).
98. Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1549 (11th Cir. 1995).
99. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 246–47 (2013) (stating that even in the absence
of any “formal certification,” a dog’s recent completion of a “training program that
evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs” may be presumed to be sufficient for
generating probable cause, without discussion of the nature or type of training program or
the level of proficiency required).
100. OMBUDSMAN NEW SOUTH WALES, POLICE POWERS (DRUG DETECTION DOGS)
ACT 2001 REVIEW OCTOBER 2006 PART 1, at 57 (Sept. 14, 2006),
https://www.ombo.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/4457/Review-of-the-PolicePowers-Drug-Detection-Dogs-Part-1_October-2006.pdf.
101. Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al.,
Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013) (No. 11-817), 2012 WL 3875241., at *7.
102. Id.
103. Id. at *7 n.6.
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status” that maintains an immigration focus.104 Any secondary inspection
(not a search) must be “made for the sole purpose of conducting a routine
and limited inquiry into residence status that cannot feasibly be made of
every motorist where the traffic is heavy.”105 Further detention or
questioning must be founded on reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.106
Vehicle searches beyond what can be seen via ordinary visual inspection
are not permitted without probable cause or consent107 that has been
provided knowingly and voluntarily and without coercion.108 Probable
cause is defined as an objectively reasonable belief, based on the
circumstances, that an immigration violation or crime has likely occurred,
which is a higher standard to meet than reasonable suspicion.109 However,
Border Patrol agents appear to ignore these requirements in internal nonborder operations. Agents often provide no reason at all for conducting a
search or offer reasons that cannot rise to the level of probable cause, such
as the ones laid out above including the vehicle smelling like a skunk,
possessing a backpack, and possessing prescription medication. Searches
have also been justified on the basis of the motorist not consenting to a
search,110 resulting in a legal catch-22 where a search with no legal cause
will be conducted no matter what, either with consent (often provided
under pressure) or via “probable cause” manufactured through the lack of
consent. Probable cause as a legal condition would thus effectively be
eliminated. This elimination of Fourth Amendment restrictions results in
something less like a “border search exception” and more like a “Border
Patrol search exception.”
The Supreme Court has also held that immigration checkpoints must
operate with a primary purpose of immigration enforcement.111

104. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976); see also United
States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 433 (5th Cir. 2001) (“The scope of an
immigration checkpoint stop is limited to the justifying, programmatic purpose of the stop:
determining the citizenship status of persons passing through the checkpoint.”).
105. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 560.
106. Id.; see also United States v. Ellis, 330 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n
agent at an immigration stop may investigate nonimmigration matters beyond the
permissible length of the immigration stop if and only if the initial lawful stop creates
reasonable suspicion warranting further investigation.”); United States v. Preciado-Robles,
964 F.2d 882, 884–85 (9th Cir. 1992) (articulable suspicion is required for detention
following immigration questioning and “there must be a valid basis for any additional
intrusion, and it must be of a brief duration”).
107. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558; see also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891, 896–97 (1975).
108. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).
109. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949).
110. Lyall Letter, supra note 85, at 15.
111. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40–42 (2000) (a highway
checkpoint violates the Fourth Amendment if its “primary purpose” is drug interdiction);
see also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558 (immigration checkpoints near the southern U.S.
border are permissible only if they involve a “brief detention of travelers” during which all
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Immigration checkpoints may not be operated as drug checkpoints or
primarily focused on broader law enforcement crime control aims;112 such
use would be an unconstitutional violation of Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.113 However, the
individual reports and complaints undermine each of these premises and
conditions. For example, Border Patrol enforcement activities often appear
to be aimed at drug enforcement. Checkpoints are much more likely to
uncover drug offenses than immigration ones—particularly small amounts
of marijuana—and U.S. citizens are largely the ones impacted.114 The New
Hampshire case discussed above is one such example. Drug interdiction
appeared to be the primary focus of the New Hampshire checkpoint
because drug dogs were brought in, the state police were enlisted in
advance with the specific purpose of handling drug cases, and plans were
made as to how to most efficiently proceed with the anticipated drug
evidence and suspects so that state police could pursue prosecution.
Afterward, the local police chief lauded the operation, stating that Border
Patrol has “a lot more leeway” than the police do when it comes to
constitutional rights, as he would have needed reasonable suspicion before
conducting the drug searches that took place.115 Given that local police
have no official interest in or jurisdiction of immigration enforcement,
their heavy involvement in the CBP checkpoint strongly suggested that the
primary purpose of the activity was drug enforcement. The trial court
agreed, holding that the checkpoint involved government drug
enforcement activity that violated both the state and federal
constitutions.116
Indeed, at checkpoints across the country, many individuals report
being detained, searched, and questioned about weapons, drugs, and even
medical history, without ever being asked about immigration-related

that is required of the travelers is “a response to a brief question or two and possibly the
production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United States”).
112. City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 44 (“[W]e decline to approve a program whose
primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime
control.”). This would include objectives such as gun control, deterrence of criminal
activity, location of suspects, etc. See Jason Fiebig, Police Checkpoints: Lack of Guidance
from the Supreme Court Contributes to Disregard of Civil Liberties in the District of
Columbia, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 599, 599 (2010).
113. City of Indianapolis, 531 U.S. at 42 (“Without drawing the line at roadblocks
designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment
would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life.”).
114. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 3, 15; Nixon, supra note 60; Misra, supra note
52.
115. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of their Consolidated Motion to
Suppress at 1, State v. McCarthy, No. 469-2017-CR-01888 (N.H. Dec. 8, 2017), available
at http://bit.ly/2mpkOWO.
116. State v. McCarthy, No. 469-2017-CR-01888, at *12 (N.H. 2d Cir. 2017),
available at https://bit.ly/3bU26LQ.
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issues or residence status at all.117 In a forceful dissent in a 1993 Ninth
Circuit case, Judge Kozinski noted the significance of the fact that 50
million vehicles per year pass through just two Border Patrol checkpoints
in California.118 The sheer amount of contraband seized there, combined
with the special drug enforcement training received by agents,119 provides
“reason to suspect the agents working these checkpoints are looking for
more than illegal aliens . . . [which] turns a legitimate administrative search
into a massive violation of the Fourth Amendment,” according to Judge
Kozinski.120 As such, evidence suggests that “the Constitution is being
routinely violated at these checkpoints,” as they have been turned into
“general law enforcement checkpoints” in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.121
B.

Roving Patrols

In addition to the permanent and temporary internal checkpoints,
CBP also conducts roving patrols, whereby Border Patrol agents pull over
motorists and question them outside of established checkpoint locations.
These stops sometimes result in searches, detentions, and arrests, and have
been the subject of frequent complaints by motorists who claim they were
stopped without any justification,122 sometimes reporting additional
privacy violations as well as aggressive and abusive treatment.
Federal regulation provides 100 miles as the limit of what is a
“reasonable distance” for Border Patrol activity, and all established
checkpoints appear to fall within that range. However, the agency itself
appears to reject that limitation with respect to its roving stops.123 Despite
the vast territory covered by the federal 100-mile regulation, Border Patrol
regularly operates more than 100 miles into the interior of the U.S., which
has been condoned by the Fifth and Tenth Circuits.124 For example, in
117. See, e.g., Lyall Letter, supra note 85, at 13 (reporting that ten of fifteen
individuals involved in the complaint in question were never asked about residence status).
118. United States v. Soyland, 3 F.3d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
119. See id. at 1318.
120. Id. at 1316.
121. Id. at 1319–20.
122. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 6.
123. Id. at 6 n.19.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Pacheco-Espinosa, 121 Fed. Appx. 352, 356–57 (10th
Cir. 2005) (“Current regulations interpret ‘reasonable distance’ as 100 air miles from the
border. The Tenth Circuit has nevertheless held that the regulation does not foreclose
searches beyond that limit . . . [and] this Court determines that the approximately 120-mile
distance in which Defendant was stopped was a reasonable distance from the
border.”); United States v. Orozco, 191 F.3d 578, 581 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that because
there is no “bright line test” regarding proximity to the border, a search conducted between
200 and 300 miles of the border can be reasonable.). But see Orozco, 191 F.3d at 584
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (“As I read Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court’s authorization of
roving Border Patrol stops on the basis of reasonable suspicion is limited to such stops
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2010 a man was pulled over by Border Patrol north of San Antonio, 167
miles from the nearest border crossing. The justification for the stop
consisted of “body posture” and “never acknowledg[ing] the agents” as he
drove past them.125 A number of similar stories can be found from the same
area (e.g. San Antonio, 146 miles from the nearest border crossing; San
Angelo, 156 miles from the nearest border crossing).126
Other cases have involved stops that took place 125 miles from the
border;127 190 miles from the border,128 200 miles from the border,129 235
miles from the border,130 and 300–400 miles from the border.131 Although
the distance from the border in these cases was relevant in determining
whether reasonable suspicion existed (under the presumption that closer
proximity to the border increases the likelihood that a person recently
crossed it illegally), the distance from the border does not appear to be of
concern to some courts in determining whether Border Patrol possessed
authority to act in the first place, despite the 100-mile zone rule. This has
resulted in an implicit acceptance of Border Patrol’s practice of ignoring
the regulation. Additionally, Border Patrol regularly operates on tribal
lands as well, conducting frequent searches and seizures of tribal
members, often with no constitutional justification.132 When the issue of
operational jurisdiction has been explicitly addressed by the courts, a few
have accepted the Border Patrol’s argument for disregarding the 100-mile
regulation. These courts concluded that distances greater than 100 miles
from the border are in fact “reasonable” for Border Patrol to operate.133
C.

Constitutional Considerations

Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that when law enforcement stops
an individual and restrains his or her freedom to leave, including with a
vehicular traffic stop, this constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment

within the 100 mile border zone created by 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.1. It
would be unreasonable to assume that the Supreme Court meant to dilute the protections
of the Fourth Amendment so as to authorize the Border Patrol to make suspicion-based
roving patrol stops anywhere in the United States. The Court’s opinion indicates no such
intention.”).
125. Armendariz, supra note 48, at 557.
126. Id.
127. LYALL ET AL, supra note 48, at 6.
128. United States v. Lamas, 608 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1979).
129. United States v. Cervantes, 797 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 2015).
130. United States v. Venzor-Castillo, 991 F.2d 634, 635, 640 (10th Cir. 1993)
(holding that a search 235 miles from the border exceeded CBP authority).
131. United States v. Ortega-Serrano, 788 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1986).
132. Lyall Letter, supra note 85, at 9.
133. See United States v. Pacheco-Espinosa, 121 Fed. Appx. 352, 356–57 (10th Cir.
2005); see also United States v. Orozco, 191 F.3d 578, 581 (5th Cir. 1999).
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purposes.134 The legitimacy of such seizures, then, depends on the
reasonableness of the stop. In cases litigating the constitutionality of
Border Patrol enforcement activity, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
agents may conduct roving immigration stops involving brief questioning
of motorists, but they must have “reasonable suspicion” that the vehicle
contains aliens who may be illegally present in the country before the stop
in order for it to pass constitutional muster.135 The Court defined
“reasonable suspicion” as “specific articulable facts, together with rational
inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the
vehicles contain aliens who may be illegally in the country.”136 Random
vehicular stops are clearly prohibited,137 and the decision explicitly limits
the scope of the relevant administrative regulations and the authority
granted to Border Patrol agents.138 The Court determined that the
alternative argued for by the government, which was to allow Border
Patrol officers to conduct roving stops without any reasonable suspicion
at all, would amount to “potentially unlimited interference” with lawful
residents’ use of any streets and highways, simply because those residents
live within the applicable zone.139 Similarly, the Court concluded such
unlimited interference would clearly run afoul of Fourth Amendment
principles. Not only does the stop need to be reasonable at its inception,
but the subsequent actions of the officer “must be ‘strictly tied to and
justified by’” the grounds justifying the stop.140
What qualifies as “reasonable suspicion,” however, is not entirely
clear. The analysis must take into account the “totality of
circumstances,”141 which often includes the officer’s subjective
impressions.142 Yet the Fifth Circuit has held that even when an officer
subjectively believes suspicion is warranted, that alone is insufficient; the
objective reasonableness of the suspicion must be assessed.143 A
combination of factors that would each be insufficient alone may, when

134. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (holding that a traffic stop without
“at least articulable and reasonable suspicion . . . [is] unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment”).
135. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); see also
Standards for Enforcement Activities, 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2) (2019) (discussing when
interrogations and detentions do not amount to an arrest).
136. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 882–83.
140. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
141. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002).
142. See, e.g., Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 (stating that officers may base their
assessment on their “experience in detecting illegal entry and smuggling”); see also United
States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 433 (5th Cir. 2005).
143. United States v. Lamas, 608 F.2d 547, 548–49 (5th Cir. 1979).
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taken together, provide reasonable suspicion.144 The Court has specified
some factors that may be relevant to a reasonable suspicion inquiry
(known as the Brignoni-Ponce “reasonable suspicion” test), including: 1)
“characteristics of the area”; 2) “previous experience [of the agent] with
alien traffic”; 3) “proximity to the border”; 4) usual traffic patterns on the
road in question; 5) known “information about recent illegal border
crossings in the area;” 6) “the driver’s behavior” (such “as erratic driving
or obvious attempts to evade officers”); 7) obvious “aspects of the vehicle”
(such as large hidden compartments, apparent heavy load, large number of
passengers); and 8) the number, appearance, or behavior of the passengers
(such as a very full vehicle or passengers attempting to hide).145 However,
although proximity to the border may be relevant, it is not enough in itself.
The Fifth Circuit expressed reluctance to allow interference with motorists
within proximity of the border, even when close to it, noting that the border
proximity element for reasonable suspicion should also contain some
evidence that the vehicle actually recently crossed the border.146 Courts
have frequently focused on whether the agent had reason to conclude that
the stopped vehicle had in fact recently crossed a border.147 In fact, border
crossing is considered to be a “vital element” (though not essential) in the
reasonable suspicion analysis.148 The Fifth Circuit held that the mere fact
that a vehicle is traveling on a road leading away from the border is “not
sufficient cause to believe the vehicle came from the border,” and held that
the further the stop occurs from the border, the weaker this factor will
be.149 The court also held that vehicles traveling more than 50 miles from
the border are considered a “substantial distance from the border,”
rendering obsolete the proximity element of reasonable suspicion.150
Proximity has thus been found missing with stops that took place 50
miles,151 55 miles,152 60 miles,153 70 miles,154 and 190 miles155 from the
border. In another case, the Fifth Circuit determined—apparently without
irony—that agents did not have reason to believe that a vehicle “spotted
some 300–400 miles north of the border . . . had recently come from the
border.”156
144.
433–34.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884–85; see also Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at
See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884–85.
United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 1984).
See United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 722 (5th Cir. 1994).
Lamas, 608 F.2d at 549.
Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d at 411.
Inocencio, 40 F.3d at 722 n.7.
United States v. Martinez, 526 F.2d 954, 955 (5th Cir. 1976).
United States v. Lopez, 564 F.2d 710, 712 (5th Cir. 1977).
United States v. Del Bosque, 523 F.2d 1251, 1251 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
United States v. Escamilla, 560 F.2d 1229, 1230 (5th Cir. 1977).
United States v. Lamas, 608 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1979).
United States v. Ortega-Serrano, 788 F.2d 299, 301 (5th Cir. 1986).
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The reasons claimed for stops vary considerably. For example, agents
have claimed suspicion based on how drivers were holding the steering
wheel, because they were looking straight ahead, because they looked
“nervous” while driving,157 or because of construction equipment in the
vehicle.158 Similarly, some motorists were accused of simultaneously
looking “stoic and nervous,”159 an odd combination that appears to not be
an uncommon claim. This very accusation was used in United States v.
Alvarado.160 Additionally, motorists have been stopped for driving too
fast, too slow, driving on less-used roadways, driving early in the morning,
or with no explanation at all.161 Occasionally, agents do not bother hiding
their profiling, claiming that the stop was due to the fact that the motorist
looked “Mexican”162 or when questioned as to the reason for the stop,
simply stating, “We’ll think of something.”163 Vehicle searches after stops
have been justified due to motorists not looking the agent in the eyes or
declining to answer questions about employment.164
Courts have held some purported “suspicious” factors to be
insufficient to justify a stop. For example, neither an officer’s mere
hunch165 nor the individual’s racial or ethnic appearance is enough.166
Other elements that have been held insufficient, even sometimes in the
context of multiple factors. A few such factors include slouching in one’s
seat,167 an uneven vehicle paint job,168 a car that did not look like a “typical
tourist’s car,”169 out of state plates,170 not making eye contact with an agent
as they drove past,171 a passenger picking up a newspaper,172 wearing seat
belts,173 passengers not conversing with one another,174 not carrying

157. Armendariz, supra note 48, at 557.
158. Id. at 559.
159. Id.
160. United States v. Alvarado, 635 F. Supp. 2d 586, 587 (W.D. Tex. 2009).
161. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 5.
162. Armendariz, supra note 48, at 559.
163. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 5.
164. Id. at 23.
165. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
166. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886 (1975); see also United
States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that “Hispanic
appearance is, in general, of such little probative value that it may not be considered as a
relevant factor where particularized or individualized suspicion is required”); United States
v. Ortega-Serrano, 788 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1986).
167. See United States v. Rodriguez-Rivas, 151 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1998); see
also United States v. Lamas, 608 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1979).
168. Ortega-Serrano, 788 F.2d at 302.
169. Lamas, 608 F.2d at 549.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 550.
172. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 2000).
173. United States v. Rangel-Portillo, 586 F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 2009).
174. Id.
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shopping bags while leaving a Wal-Mart,175 having uncombed hair, or
being “kind of dirty looking.”176 However, as these examples demonstrate,
the reasons given for agent suspicion are case-specific, highly variable,
and sometimes odd. What amounts to a suspicion that is legally
“reasonable” is highly unsettled, and as will be shown below, is sometimes
baseless. The practice of stopping vehicles without reasonable suspicion
and coming up with reasons later is so common that it is internally
nicknamed: “shotgunning,” according to two CBP whistleblowers.177
Roving patrols are widely reported to be largely based on ethnic
appearance (those with darker complexion are more likely to be targeted
for interrogation),178 often take place far from the border, and data shows
they are highly unproductive. Indeed, an investigation from 2006 to 2009
revealed that recent border crossers are not targeted, many lawful residents
are wrongfully arrested, and approximately 1% of stops resulted in the
removal proceedings of undocumented individuals.179 Some offices even
offer agents incentives for arrests. For example, agents in Rochester, New
York were offered cash bonuses and gift cards based on their arrest
numbers.180 From 2006 to 2010, the Rochester office was responsible for
the arrests of approximately 300 legal individuals, who were later released
with no charges.181
Additionally, CBP appears to be conflating court decisions dealing
with its authority at immigration checkpoints, with its authority to stop
vehicles and question their occupants as part of a roving patrol. At regular
checkpoints, no suspicion is required for brief questioning about
immigration status, but for roving stops, reasonable suspicion is
required.182 CBP appears to sometimes treat all stops as de facto
“checkpoints” that it asserts are justified even with no suspicion at all. A
complaint in 2012 asserted that a Border Patrol supervisor instructed
agents to stop all vehicles on a road near the border simply because the
vehicles were on the road. Remarkably, the complaint was submitted from
within the agency, by a Border Patrol agent. There is no evidence that the
complaint was ever investigated or that the supervisor was ever
disciplined.183 Indeed, the increasing reports of Border Patrol stops of
buses and trains, without any suspicion of wrongdoing, represents such a
175. Id.
176. United States v. Ortega-Serrano, 788 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1986).
177. LYALL ET AL, supra note 48, at 7.
178. N.Y.C.L.U., supra note 79, at 2.
179. Id.
180. ANNA SCHOENFELDER ET AL., UNCOVERING USBP: BONUS PROGRAMS FOR
UNITED STATES BORDER PATROL AGENTS AND THE ARREST OF LAWFULLY PRESENT
INDIVIDUALS, at iv (2013), http://bit.ly/2lWFXr6
181. Id.
182. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
183. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 4.
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conflation. But in reality, outside of established checkpoints, reasonable
suspicion is required for such stops—even within the 100-mile zone.
Such stops of vehicles of mass transportation might be termed
“roving checkpoints,” which are neither formal temporary checkpoints nor
individual stops based on purported reasonable suspicion and therefore do
not meet the requirements of either type of stop, even within the 100-mile
zone. Multiple reports have surfaced of Border Patrol agents in places as
far-flung as Florida, New York, and Washington state stopping and
boarding passenger buses and trains and demanding citizenship or
residency information from passengers.184 Where the granting authority to
conduct such searches was previously limited to CBP headquarters in
Washington, D.C., the decision-making power has been delegated to field
supervisors under the Trump administration.185 The delegation of authority
to field supervisors appears to be an expansion of CBP authority to
question individuals at border checkpoints, but is more akin to a roving
stop without the required reasonable suspicion necessary to justify the
stop.
CBP asserts its authority to conduct such suspicion-less seizures via
the 100-mile regulation, although they appear to be reaching well beyond
that distance as well. For example, one report indicated that Border Patrol
agents boarded a bus at an agricultural checkpoint near the
California/Nevada
border
demanding
“documentation
from
passengers.”186 The location was almost 205 miles from the Mexico
border.187 Other incidents involved the boarding of buses traveling from
Orlando to Miami and Seattle to Montana, neither of which originated or
ended anywhere near the Mexican border, but reports suggest during these
stops passengers were racially profiled.188 Similarly, Border Patrol agents
also detained and boarded multiple buses at a gas station in Sandusky,
Ohio,189 as well as in Spokane, Washington (the latter of which is about
100 air miles from the Canadian border), questioning passengers

184. See Nixon, supra note 60; see also Skebba, supra note 60 (noting that Border
Patrol activity has been reported on trains passing through Toledo).
185. See Nixon, supra note 60.
186. Megan Cerullo, California Woman Who Knows Her Rights Forces Border
Patrol off Greyhound Bus at Agricultural Checkpoint, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 14, 2018,
2:30 AM), https://bit.ly/2lkraGK.
187. The route from Bakersfield to Las Vegas is via Interstate 15. At the point where
that route approaches the Nevada border from California, the distance to the Mexican
border is approximately 205 air miles. See Distance Calculator, supra note 50,
https://www.freemaptools.com/how-far-is-it-between-primm_-nv-usa-and-mexicali_mexico.htm (calculating the distance between Primm, NV and Mexicali, Mexico).
188. Nixon, supra note 60.
189. Skebba, supra note 60.
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demanding proof of legal status.190 Passengers present at such stops often
report that the non-white passengers are targeted for questioning and
demanded to produce documentation.191
Legally, these activities are problematic. Agents are not permitted to
stop vehicles without first having reasonable suspicion of an immigration
crime. Mere presence on a bus or train certainly does not qualify. CBP
appears to be treating these stops under the same sweeping authority with
which they operate general immigration checkpoints where all motorists
are stopped. However, these stops are not general administrative
immigration checkpoints. Additionally, CBP has not disclosed any
information about these operations, therefore, passenger reports are the
sole source of information. It is unclear whether agents have conducted
additional searches or detentions without probable cause in the course of
these activities.
The standard for when such transit checks will take place, according
to CBP spokesperson Stephanie Malin, is whenever and wherever there is
an “operational benefit” to doing so.192 No definition of “operational
benefit” was provided. Therefore, conceivably, any chance of
apprehending an undocumented immigrant (however small) might be
considered to qualify. Indeed, the agency’s own data indicates that only
2–3%of illegal entrants were apprehended at interior checkpoints.193
Additionally, the majority of those impacted at interior checkpoints are
citizens, with non-white individuals disproportionately targeted. CBP has
also asserted that these mass transit checks are “consensual encounters,”
suggesting that passengers are free to refuse to respond or cooperate,
which is directly contradicted by reports that indicate that passengers are
required to cooperate.194 In addition to these frequent stops of motorists,
there have also been increasing reports of Border Patrol agents
approaching and interrogating people at hospitals (including maternity
wards), courthouses, gas stations,195 laundromats thought to be used by
farm workers,196 and on sidewalks.197

190. Mitch Ryals, US Border Patrol has been arresting people from Spokane’s
Greyhound station. The ACLU says to cut it out, INLANDER (Mar. 21, 2018, 2:38 PM),
http://bit.ly/2mkMufi.
191. See, e.g., Skebba, supra note 60.
192. Nixon, supra note 60.
193. Id.; Misra, supra note 52.
194. Misra, supra note 52.
195. See, e.g., Saucedo-Carrillo v. United States, 983 F. Supp. 2d 917, 920 (N.D.
Ohio 2013) (mother and daughter were approached by Border Patrol agent while
purchasing gasoline; agent blocked their vehicle and began questioning them, allegedly
due to their Hispanic appearance).
196. Miller, supra note 61.
197. 100-Mile Rule, supra note 46, at 2; see also Vasquez-Palafox v. United States,
No. 3:12 CV 2380, 2013 WL 1500472, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 10, 2013) (discussing how
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There are frequent complaints of agent abuse, including agents
aggressively driving and tailgating; displaying knives; threatening
motorists with electroshock weapons and assault rifles in routine traffic
encounters; mocking and insulting people; forcibly taking cell phones
when motorists attempted to record the encounter and deleting footage;
threatening to shoot people and pets; unprovoked physical assault; and
even spitting on motorists.198 For example, two teenage sisters recently
reported that a Border Patrol agent conducted a strip search of them
without cause, during which he sexually assaulted each of them.199 The
sisters immediately reported the offense and an investigation ensued
(which itself is a relatively rare response to complaints). However, no
charges resulted and there is no indication of any disciplinary action
against the agent either, despite investigators noting the agent’s suspicious
behavior during the interview.200
Such a result appears unusual only in that there was any investigation
at all. One study found that in a five-and-a-half-year period beginning in
2010, there were 84 complaints against CBP agents of coerced sexual
contact.201 Of those, only seven investigations were conducted, and of
those, no charges were filed.202 Part of the difficulty appears to be related
to internal CBP culture, while the other part concerns a complaint handling
process that is structurally dysfunctional. CBP environment promotes a
culture of dehumanization and impunity that leads to abuse and assault on
the part of agents, according to one former agent, who summed up the
approach as one of “kick ass, ask questions later.”203 Agents were
encouraged to “operate in the gray.”204 As disturbing as are some of the
reports about Border Patrol actions at checkpoints and roving stops, their
activities patrolling the remote areas along the border appear to be even
more disturbing,205 but are beyond the scope of this paper.
a man was approached and questioned by two Border Patrol agents while walking down a
street in Fremont, Ohio after picking up his son at school).
198. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 7.
199. Nomaan Merchant & Claudia Lauer, Immigrants face hurdles to prove abuse by
U.S. agents, PBS NEWS HOUR (Oct. 14, 2018, 11:29 AM), https://to.pbs.org/2P0ee5s.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See John Washington, “Kick Ass, Ask Questions Later”: A Border Patrol
Whistleblower Speaks Out About Culture of Abuse Against Migrants, INTERCEPT (Sept. 20,
2018, 4:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2OC910s; see also FERCHIL RAMOS, NEGLECT AND ABUSE
OF UNACCOMPANIED IMMIGRANT CHILDREN BY U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION 2
(2018), http://bit.ly/2kMGOKs [hereinafter ACLU NEGLECT AND ABUSE].
204. Washington, supra note 203.
205. For instance, Border Patrol policy permits deadly force in response to “rocking,”
or throwing rocks at agents. This not only has resulted in multiple deaths at the hands of
agents, but also may encourage false claims of thrown rocks when migrants are killed. See
Graff, supra note 13, at 5–6.; see also Brian Bennett & Joseph Tanfani, Times
Investigation: A Family Outing, then a Deadly Border Patrol Shooting, L.A. TIMES (Oct.
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Border Patrol norms strongly resist the reporting of misconduct; the
operational philosophy is to keep things internal, with a “frontier justice”
approach and a “what happens in the field stays in the field” attitude,
according to former DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner.206 Referred
to as the “Green Line of silence,” the internal understanding that activities
will not be spoken about publicly is “higher and wider than it’s ever been
before,” according to the former head of CBP Internal Affairs James
Tomsheck.207 Any such speaking out is well understood to elicit retaliation
and the end of one’s career.208
The DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is responsible for
handling complaints against Border Patrol agents, but there is no clear or
uniform system by which the OIG either receives or manages
complaints.209 For example, complaints may be submitted to the OIG,
Joint Intake Center (JIC), CBP Office of Internal Affairs (OIA), the DHS
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), or local CBP
offices.210 Complaints coming to OIG are typically referred back to the
CBP office where they originated for handling.211 In 2012, OIG retained
only three complaints for investigation nationwide; in 2013, the number
was four.212 Additionally, none of the complaints investigated in 2012 or
2013 involved Fourth Amendment search and seizure violations, even
though these types of complaints are common.213 Furthermore, OIG does
not disclose the complaints received.214 Occasionally, a complaint is
referred to the CRCL, which has no disciplinary authority and does not
even offer recommendations on individual cases. Rather, the CRCL
simply makes general recommendations to DHS about policies, practices,
and training.215 Nevertheless, in 2016 alone, that office received over
18, 2014, 12:00 PM), https://lat.ms/211fjbc. “Tuning up” refers to roughing migrants up in
the field before bringing them in to the station and “tonk” is a term for migrants that refers
to the sound a flashlight makes when it hits them on the head. According to one agent,
when an agent uses force via pepper spray or a baton, a written memo is required, however,
blunt force on the head with a flashlight does not, so agents were encouraged to go that
route. See Washington, supra note 203. Various forms of torture and abuse have been
reported, including handcuffing two migrants together around a cactus. Id. Records reveal
rampant physical abuse, refusal of medical services, denial of food and water, and improper
deportation, including of children, in what one ACLU report concludes is “neglectful at
best and sadistic at worst.” See ACLU NEGLECT AND ABUSE, supra note 203, at 2.
206. Graff, supra note 13, at 4.
207. Washington, supra note 203.
208. Id.
209. See Lyall Letter, supra note 85, at 8.
210. MARTINEZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 2.
211. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 8.
212. Id. at 9.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 10.
215. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 2 (2017), http://bit.ly/2kPK4VB (providing a handout that explains the role of
the CRCL).
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2,000 complaints.216 Additionally, the OIA also conducts investigations
regarding allegations of misconduct.217 However, the ACLU reports that
the types of complaints OIA investigates are limited and the office
frequently sends complaints back to the originating sector where the
complaints are usually dismissed.218 There is no public report of the
number or types of cases that OIA investigates.219 Tomsheck, the former
head of the OIA, stated that DHS oversight was “clearly engineered to
interfere with our efforts to hold the Border Patrol accountable.”220 The
few records that are available suggest a stark lack of oversight or
accountability.221
Additionally, CBP does not accurately disclose its complaints to the
public or to Congress. For example, in the CRCL FY 2014 report to
Congress, only two Fourth Amendment “complaints opened” were
reported nationwide.222 However, the ACLU alone provided to CRCL over
a dozen complaints from that period, just from Arizona.223 In addition, the
definition of “corruption” was altered by CBP to a much narrower
conception, so that nearly a third of all corruption cases were eliminated
in reports. Subsequently, what the agency deems “non-mission
compromising” corruption, such as sexual assault of detainees, is not
included in any report to Congress.224 However, CBP agent misconduct is
so common that it was the top criminal priority for the FBI in McAllen,
Texas in 2014.225 One report indicates that Border Patrol agents are
arrested five times more often than other types of law enforcement
agents.226 CBP reported no Fourth Amendment complaints at all for FY
2013.227 However, CBP’s own records from that period, covering just two
sectors out of twenty, show at least 134 Fourth Amendment complaints,
which itself is vastly incomplete because about half of the relevant
documents were withheld.228 In 2014, the ACLU submitted a FOIA
request for information about Border Patrol activities. After receiving no

216. Id.
217. How CBP Handles Traveler Complaints, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION, http://bit.ly/2lSdCC4 (last modified June 2, 2017).
218. Lyall Letter, supra note 85, at 10.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. ACLU NEGLECT AND ABUSE, supra note 203, at 2.
222. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 10.
223. Id.
224. Graff, supra note 13, at 7.
225. Id.
226. See Justin Rohrlich & Zoe Schlanger, Border Officers are arrested 5 times more
often than other US law enforcement, QUARTZ (July 16, 2019), http://bit.ly/2lY60hf.
(noting 176 arrests of Border Patrol agents between October 2018 and July 2019).
227. Lyall Letter, supra note 85, at 9–10.
228. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 5.
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response, the ACLU filed suit,229 after which CBP released half of the
relevant records, heavily redacted.230
In response to this FOIA litigation, the CBP produced complaint data
indicating that in a three-year period beginning in January 2009, there
were 809 complaints of misconduct filed against Border Patrol agents.231
This number is likely a small percentage of the total incidents of
misconduct, given the strong barriers and incentives weighing against the
filing of a complaint. Evidence suggests that the vast majority of violations
result in no complaint;232 those who have been deported, who do not have
legal status, who lack financial resources, or whose first language is not
English (complaint forms are only available in English),233 for example,
are especially unlikely to come forward.234 Of the abuse complaints that
were filed (including physical, sexual, and verbal abuse), a staggering 97%
resulted in “no action taken.”235 Specific complaints included death
threats; improper strip searches at checkpoints; hitting a person’s head
against a rock and causing a hematoma; kicking a pregnant woman and
causing a miscarriage; kicking and stomping on people who were
handcuffed and/or laying on the ground; sexual touching and rape; and
being left naked in a cell.236 Additionally, over 7% of the alleged incidents
were perpetrated against minors.237 Physical abuse and excessive use of
force accounted for 78% of complaints.238 After “no action taken,” the
most common result of a complaint was counseling for the agent, which
was the result in six of the 809 complaints.239 In addition, two complaints
resulted in court proceedings, while two other agents received an oral
reprimand. Of the complaints, only one resulted in the perpetrator’s
suspension,240 which was for a period of one day. The victim in that case,
which alleged an unlawful vehicle stop, was a government employee and
the son of a retired Border Patrol agent.241 Civil rights complaints are
designated as a lower priority and are then delegated to the local office
where the agent in question is stationed, which preempts the possibility of

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
MARTINEZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 4.
LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 5.
Id.; see also Submit a Complaint or Concern, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER
PROTECTION,
https://bit.ly/2Q3dRWc (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
234. MARTINEZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 4.
235. Id. at 1.
236. See id. at 6.
237. See id. at 7.
238. See id. at 10.
239. Id. at 8.
240. See id.
241. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 10.
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independent oversight.242 A follow-up investigation spanning 2012 to
2015 found strikingly similar results. For example, allegations included
serious physical abuse, running a person over with a vehicle, sexually
assaulting a woman in a hospital, and denying medical attention to
children.243 Nearly 96% of all complaints resulted in “no action.”244
Even agents’ use of deadly force appears to be dismissed, with agents
not being held accountable. Between 2005 and 2014, of 48 identified cases
of Border Patrol agents killing people in the line of duty, not a single one
resulted in internal discipline, much less criminal charges.245 One of these
cases involved a Border Patrol agent killing an unarmed teenager, whom
he shot in the back ten times through the border fence into Mexico;246 he
was far from the only victim who has been shot in the back.247 An internal
report indicated that Border Patrol agents sometimes shoot their weapons
out of “frustration.”248 Additionally, in a report by the Police Executive
Research Forum, 67 incidents of use of lethal force were identified in a
period spanning two years and nine months beginning in 2010, with many
being deemed unjustifiable by the report.249 Not a single use of lethal force
resulted in either internal discipline or legal action.250 This is nothing short
of stunning. By way of comparison, the Chicago Police Department (CPD)
had a force of approximately 12,100 officers in 2016,251 compared with
Border Patrol’s 19,400.252 CPD has taken disciplinary action against
officers in 1,360 separate cases between 2000 and 2016253—a figure
representing 1.2% of all complaints, which is widely considered to be
problematically low. Yet, with more than 7,000 additional officers in
Border Patrol ranks than in the CPD and thousands of documented
242. See id. at 16.
243. CANTOR & EWING, supra note 27, at 1.
244. Id. at 4.
245. Bob Ortega, Name of border agent who shot teen released by judge, AZCENTRAL
(Nov. 13, 2014, 9:22 PM), http://bit.ly/2lT12mf.
246. Id.
247. Graff, supra note 13, at 20 (quoting James Wong, a CBP internal affairs
investigator who stated that “there were a number of people shot in the back”).
248. Id. at 6.
249. See Bob Ortega, CBP: No action against border agents in deadly-force cases,
AZCENTRAL (June 8, 2015, 11:24 AM), http://bit.ly/2m2OYP2; see also Deaths by Border
Patrol Since 2010, SOUTHERN BORDER COMMUNITIES COALITION, http://bit.ly/2kQQNOU
(last updated Nov. 6, 2019) (identifying 99 people who have died “as the result of an
encounter with U.S. border agents” since 2010).
250. See Ortega, supra note 249.
251. Cecilia Reyes, To Grow Size of Police Department, Chicago Will Need Twice
What is Planned, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 17, 2016, 10:37 AM), http://bit.ly/2kR7Wbn.
252. U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PATROL, SECTOR PROFILE – FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 1
(2017), http://bit.ly/2moYgoZ [hereinafter CBP Sector Profile].
253. Jason Tashea, Only 1.2% of Chicago police complaints lead to suspension or
firing, new data says, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 16, 2018, 8:00 AM), http://bit.ly/2lY2gg1 (citing
Citizens Police Data Project, INVISIBLE INST., http://bit.ly/2kTF81P (last visited January 6,
2020)).
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complaints, there have been virtually no cases of disciplinary action
against Border Patrol officers. The report on Border Patrol concluded that
CBP’s own policies regarding the use of force were well beyond
mainstream law enforcement standards in the U.S., with many cases
failing to “meet the test of objective reasonableness.”254 The American
Immigration Council concluded that the CBP complaint system is merely
“ornamental,” having no appreciable influence on the agency at all.255
Thus, CBP internal complaints are a woefully inadequate remedy for the
violation of constitutional rights.
In the face of a dysfunctional internal complaint process, the only
other recourse for a victim of unconstitutional Border Patrol action is
through the courts. However, this route is fraught with difficulties and
roadblocks as well. In a civil lawsuit, the expenses are high, the possibility
of any recovery low, and it is difficult to prove damages. For those
individuals without legal residency status, they will likely be placed in
removal proceedings or will agree to voluntary departure, since the
consequences of a removal order are more severe than a voluntary
departure.256 In either case, the victim of the unconstitutional activity will
soon be out of the country, making it virtually impossible to file any sort
of lawsuit seeking a remedy. If a claim of rights violation is brought while
removal proceedings are underway, the victim may be reluctant to bring
up the claim out of fear of government reprisal;257 if they do, the
government will argue that the removal is proper even if the initial stop
was not legal.258 Such a claim is unlikely to occur in the context of removal
proceedings, however, because a skilled lawyer is required and individuals
in removal proceedings are not entitled to appointed counsel, and only
14% of detained immigrants have legal representation.259 Even
immigration attorneys, however, are often not well-versed in the area of
constitutional rights violations in the context of removal.260 These
disadvantages are compounded by the fact the burden falls on the
immigrant to make a prima facie case showing that the evidence was
obtained illegally before the government has any responsibility to justify
the method that the evidence was obtained.261
254. Graff, supra note 13, at 6.
255. MARTINEZ ET AL., supra note 17, at 3.
256. See Voluntary departure, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2018) (providing voluntary
departure provisions); Inadmissible aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (2018) (providing length
of time for which a person previously ordered removed is barred from applying for entry).
257. Armendariz, supra note 48, at 569.
258. Id. at 568.
259. INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFER, ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION COURT
2
(2016),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/access-counselimmigration-court.
260. Armendariz, supra note 48, at 570.
261. Barcenas, 19 I&N Dec. 609, 611–12 (B.I.A. 1988), available at
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/precedent-decisions-volume-19.
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When suspicion-less stops that take place in the 100-mile zone result
in removal proceedings, these cases are also necessarily the ones in which
the Border Patrol agents were correct in their speculation, no matter how
flimsy the reasons. This makes it inherently more difficult to challenge the
agent’s actions, as it tends to lend them an air of reasonableness. The
unknown number of cases where the agent’s suspicions bore no fruit and
rights violations could have been extreme therefore do not come before
the immigration courts. This conundrum was highlighted by a dissenting
opinion in the Fifth Circuit, which pointed out that:
Quite unfortunately, we have the opportunity only to review the
successful guesses of these agents; we are never presented with the
unconstitutionally intrusive stops of Hispanic residents and citizens
that do not result in an arrest. Differentiating the United States from
police states of past history and the present, our Constitution in its
Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches protects
all our residents, whether middle-class and well-dressed or poor and
disheveled, from arbitrary stop by governmental enforcement agents
in our travel upon the highways of this nation.262

The only cases where Border Patrol activities are legally challenged
are a small fraction of those in which some evidence of wrongdoing was
found, given that a legal challenge is expensive, difficult, and rare. The
small fraction of cases where some evidence of wrongdoing is found gives
a skewed perception that agent suspicions are highly accurate and
reasonable because the outside view is limited to cases involving a
complainant without clean hands, however small a percentage that might
be of the total who have been forced to engage with Border Patrol.
Baseless reasons for stopping, therefore, typically go unchallenged. Even
the Supreme Court acknowledged this reality when it stated that:
[e]very . . . agent knows . . . that it is highly unlikely that any particular
arrestee will end up challenging the lawfulness of his arrest in a formal
deportation proceeding. When an occasional challenge is brought, the
consequences from the point of view of the officer’s overall arrest and
deportation record will be trivial.263

As a result of the lack of accountability, internal oversight or discipline,
and the inability of victims to seek recourse, there is no disincentive for
Border Patrol agents to engage in extensive unconstitutional stops and
seizures.

262. United States v. Garcia, 732 F.2d 1221, 1229 (5th Cir. 1984) (Tate, J.,
dissenting).
263. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044
(1984).
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Further exacerbating the problem, CBP does not maintain records of
stops that do not result in arrest.264 Such lack of records naturally enables
pervasive abuse and unconstitutional searches at locations far from the
actual border, sometimes even further inland than the “100-mile zone.” In
such cases, individuals are ultimately released and there is no record that
an incident even took place.265 Even when the agent conducts a search of
a vehicle, if nothing is found, no record is made of the event, despite the
fact that the “border search exception” does not apply in these locations.
Moreover, because these individuals are released, there is likewise no
ensuing court proceeding where the Fourth Amendment violations may be
brought to light. Therefore, there is no way to know beyond anecdotal
evidence how widespread the abuses are and how many innocent people
have had their rights violated. But these anecdotal reports—both from
victims and from insiders who have spoken out—are troubling.
In practical terms, then, even if one entirely accepted the established
legal framework and limitations of CBP enforcement activity, frequent
and serious Fourth Amendment violations are perpetrated against
individuals by Border Patrol. Substantial evidence suggests that even
CBP’s own internal regulations are regularly disregarded by agents.266
Clearly, existing oversight and accountability mechanisms, to the extent
that they are present at all, are not working to protect against constitutional
violations in the course of Border Patrol operations, and almost no
recourse is available when they take place. The incentives and
disincentives in place lend themselves only to aggressive enforcement
activity and disregard of constitutional limitations or protection of
individual rights. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment—and the
Supreme Court’s interpretations of it—is to restrain government power
and intrusiveness and to protect the rights of individuals from
overreaching law enforcement abuse of power. In the case of Border
Patrol, the Fourth Amendment is not functioning as the restraint it was
intended to be. Whether this is due to intentional disregard of individual
rights or simply over-zealous and committed agents is irrelevant. In
discussing the prevalence of airport checks and the their potential for
governmental abuse, Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit observed that
“[l]iberty—the freedom from unwarranted intrusion by government—is as
easily lost through insistent nibbles by government officials who seek to
do their jobs too well as by those whose purpose it is to oppress; the
piranha can be as deadly as the shark.”267 In the case of Border Patrol,
evidence suggests we are dealing with activities more extreme and
intrusive than the “insistent nibbles” Judge Kozinski worried about.
264.
265.
266.
267.

LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 7, 11.
See id. at 11.
Armendariz, supra note 48, at 555.
United States v. $124,570 U.S. Currency, 873 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1989).
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LEGAL ANALYSIS

In addition to the apparent violations of constitutional rights by
Border Patrol in practice, there are legal questions about the constitutional
validity of the framework under which CBP currently operates. The 100mile zone, established by regulation, is neither a constitutionally-based
line nor a line with any operational meaning at all. Although Border Patrol
uses the regulation to justify conducting border enforcement activities well
inside the border, including with established checkpoints and roving
patrols, Border Patrol also ignores the regulation when it conducts
activities more than 100 miles from the border and refuses to acknowledge
the regulation as a limitation on its operations in those cases. Likewise,
Border Patrol uses the regulation to support random searches with no
suspicion, but in practice rejects court decisions requiring reasonable
suspicion for vehicle stops and searches.268
The 100-mile regulation was not enacted by Congress. There is no
record of any public or institutional debate on the matter, why 100 miles
was the designated number, or whether any other distance might be more
reasonable. Its use to justify otherwise questionable practices is therefore
exceptionally weak. Given that the regulation was written by the
Department of Justice, it amounts to the government’s own assertion of
what type of government action is “reasonable.” Although law
enforcement agencies may have a voice in the conversation concerning
where constitutional lines should be drawn in carrying out activities, their
own conclusions on those questions are entitled to no special deference.
Indeed, law enforcement agencies might reasonably be met with a healthy
dose of skepticism, given the incentives at play. Thus, to suggest that the
100-mile rule warrants any special treatment or is otherwise binding is not
only misguided, but legally and constitutionally wrong. Law enforcement
agencies may not determine what law enforcement is permitted to do under
the Constitution. Rather, this should be left to Congress and the courts to
resolve. If left to determine the appropriate constitutional limits on its own,
natural incentives and pressures intrinsic to law enforcement work will
often result in these agencies diminishing constitutional protections in
favor of efficiency, convenience, or other interests. More objectivity than
the agency’s own assessment is needed to adequately determine what is
constitutional in the context of Border Patrol activities beyond the nation’s
borders. A robust analysis of the legality of both the regulation and CBP
practices is the first necessary step in that process.

268. See, e.g., discussion infra Section IV.A, B.
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Questioning the “Reasonable Distance” Law

Contrary to the 100-mile regulation, the law upon which it is based
was duly enacted by Congress.269 That fact alone, however, does not
necessarily make the law constitutionally valid any more than it would be
if Congress passed a law permitting indiscriminate law enforcement
searches of individual homes with no warrant or probable cause. The fact
that a principle was enacted into law by a legislature provides it with no
definitive claim to constitutional validity. Indeed, Congress has fallen on
the wrong side of constitutional rights and provisions more than 170 times
with laws that have been struck down by the Supreme Court.270
The statute provides that Border Patrol may “board and search for
aliens any vessel” within a “reasonable distance from any external
boundary” for the purpose of preventing “the illegal entry of aliens.”271
There appears to be no reasonable suspicion standard required by the
statute at all. Taken at face value, this statute could mean regular and
sweeping Border Patrol searches of all cars, buses, trains, and airplanes
operating anywhere within the relevant zone, without any evidence or
suspicion, even when traveling domestically.272 Border Patrol agents
recently engaged in such activity when they demanded identification of all
deplaning passengers on an October 2017 domestic flight originating in
San Francisco and landing in JFK airport in New York City.273 It is
difficult to imagine that this sort of law enforcement intrusiveness is what
Congress had in mind when it passed the statute, particularly given that
when it was written, CBP had only 1,100 agents,274 compared to the more
than 19,000 of today.275 In fact, another paragraph of the same statute
limits Border Patrol authority to search an individual without a warrant to
situations where the agent has “reasonable cause to suspect that grounds
exist for denial of admission to the United States.”276 This limitation on
warrantless searches at the border (evidenced by the reference to the denial
269. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2012).
270. See Acts of Congress Held Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part by the Supreme
Court of the United States, JUSTIA, https://bit.ly/2m6dYF7 (last visited Sept. 26, 2019)
(listing 182 times an act of Congress has been struck down as unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court from 1789 to 2006).
271. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (2012).
272. Wesley Lowery, Federal agents ask domestic flight passengers to show IDs in
search for immigrant ordered deported, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2017),
https://wapo.st/2kXaJzE.
273. Id. However, the ACLU achieved a settlement with CBP over this incident,
resulting in new protocols prohibiting Border Protection officers from detaining domestic
flight passengers for search or inspection without suspicion. See CBP Issues New Protocols
Restricting Domestic Flight Passenger Identification Checks Following ACLU Lawsuit,
ACLU (July 11, 2019), https://bit.ly/2m5ffwc.
274. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 6 n.19.
275. CBP Sector Profile, supra note 252at 1.
276. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (2012).
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of admission) is inconsistent with a suggestion that Border Patrol was
meant to have much more expansive authority to search without probable
cause away from the border at internal checkpoints and on roving stops.
It is not clear whether, when enacting this statute, Congress
envisioned the sort of suspicion-less checkpoints and roving stops that are
now undertaken against U.S. residents and citizens by Border Patrol.
However, it is clearly within the purview of the courts to limit or strike
down the provision altogether. Courts have, in fact, already limited the
seemingly unfettered authority provided by the statute to indiscriminately
search all manner of transportation. For example, courts have held that
even within a “reasonable distance” of the border, the Fourth Amendment
requires that reasonable suspicion is required for a roving patrol stop (with
probable cause for any subsequent search). Additionally, courts have also
held that at a checkpoint, any questioning beyond limited issues of
citizenship requires reasonable suspicion, with probable cause needed for
a search.277 Courts could similarly restrict the 100 mile “reasonable
distance” as well, or provide additional constitutional limits on Border
Patrol activity inside the border.
Some federal courts have expressed disquiet with Border Patrol
conducting operations in the country’s interior, in effect “pushing the
border in” with respect to its broad border enforcement powers.278 In
striking down a Border Patrol search 235 miles from the border, the Tenth
Circuit ruled that “[t]he further one gets from the border, the greater the
likelihood the volume of legitimate travelers will increase.”279 Although
the court expressed skepticism about the legality of a search so far from
the border, it is not clear why, constitutionally speaking, the “volume of
legitimate travelers” alters the analysis. Focusing on the volume of
travelers suggests that constitutional rights are properly diminished or
eliminated if there exists a greater likelihood that violating them will bear
fruit. This would be logically no different than claiming a warrantless
search of a home for stolen property is unconstitutional in an upscale
neighborhood, but constitutionally acceptable in a low-income area,
because stolen property is more likely to be located there and the
warrantless searches would therefore be more fruitful. The absurdity of the
latter argument applies equally to the former. Evaluations of constitutional
rights cannot come down to assumptions about how successful the results
of violating them will be. Motorists and residents traveling closer to the
border are entitled to the same constitutional rights as those everywhere
else.

277. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976).
278. See, e.g., United States v. Gabriel, 405 F. Supp. 2d 50, 59 (D. Me. 2005).
279. United States v. Venzor-Castillo, 991 F.2d 634, 639 (10th Cir. 1993).
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Additionally, the Fifth Circuit’s holding that Border Patrol stops
more than 50 miles from the border lack the “vital element” of border
proximity280 establishes a precedent for giving no deference to 100 miles
as a reasonable distance. Although the question was not about Border
Patrol authority per se, but rather about the reasonableness of specific
stops (which could potentially be justified by other means), these decisions
are important in establishing that Border Patrol does not possess carte
blanche to stop and board any vehicle within 100 miles of the border
without clear, articulable cause.
The Supreme Court noted that “no Act of Congress can authorize a
violation of the Constitution.”281 As such, in applying broadly worded
statutes, courts have read into their provisions a reasonableness
requirement under the Fourth Amendment. For example, the language of
19 U.S.C. §1581 appears to authorize Customs officials to board and
search any vessel, anywhere in the U.S., with no warrant, probable cause,
or reasonable suspicion.282 In interpreting that provision, the Fifth Circuit
held that the statute was circumscribed by the Fourth Amendment such
that probable cause, consent, a border search, or some other indicia of
reasonableness was required.283 A Florida Appeals Court noted that
allowing customs officials such sweeping search authority as that statute
suggests would “fly in the face of the historical purpose of the Fourth
Amendment which was adopted to end the abuse of general exploratory
searches…”284 The courts thereby constrict the literal terms of the law in
favor of constitutional principles. The same Fourth Amendment
requirements apply to the 100-mile zone; both the regulation and the
statute must give way in the face of the Amendment’s reasonableness
conditions.
Thus, regardless of whether and to what extent Border Patrol abuses
its power in practice, the statute itself is constitutionally questionable.
Government designating 100 miles as a “reasonable distance” for Border
Patrol enforcement, by itself, does not make it reasonable—much less
constitutional. The Fourth Amendment rights of individuals inside the
country cannot reasonably depend so heavily on those individuals’
specific locations within the country in a perverse system of increasing
280. See United States v. Rubio-Hernandez, 39 F. Supp. 2d 808, 810 (W.D. Tex.
1999); see also United States v. Hernandez-Lopez, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1196 (D.N.M.
2010).
281. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
282. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2018) (“Any officer of the customs may at any time go on
board of any vessel or vehicle at any place in the United States or within the customs waters
. . . and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any
person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such vessel or
vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compliance.”).
283. United States v. D’Antignac, 628 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1980).
284. Morales v. State, 407 So. 2d 321, 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
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rights as one travels closer to some arbitrary central point and diminishing
rights heading the other direction. Whatever “likelihoods” are in play near
the border, when Border Patrol operates anywhere other than the actual
border, it should be bound by the same constitutional restrictions as all
other law enforcement agencies. There is no reasonable argument for why
Border Patrol in particular should be able to circumvent the Fourth
Amendment in its efforts to prevent illegal immigration, especially when
law enforcement officials fighting all other crimes, including extremely
dangerous and violent ones, are still bound by it. Imagine the outcry if
Congress were to permit the FBI to conduct warrantless searches of
anyone within 100 miles of suspected terrorist cells.
B.

Problems with Reasonable Suspicion

Using a reasonable suspicion standard for Border Patrol stops is
problematic. For one thing, the standard is subjective and determined on a
case-by-case basis. What is reasonable to one person may be unreasonable
to the next, and court decisions on the issue are no more uniform. Even
more problematic is that agents appear to often come up with their reasons
for suspicion after the fact, lending some appearance of reasonableness to
a stop that may not be initiated that way, once additional facts can be
gleaned. When the investigation turns up nothing, the person is released.
When it turns up evidence of wrongdoing, such evidence retrospectively
lends an air of “reasonableness” to the suspicion that was claimed by the
agent; they were correct in their suspicion, after all. However, the larger
problem is that Border Patrol actions are so rarely challenged in court that
the reasonable suspicion standard is not able to be addressed, nor is there
any internal enforcement or agency oversight. This amounts to no
applicable standard at all. Agents act accordingly. Constitutional rights
mean nothing—and cannot be said to really exist—if there is no
meaningful way to enforce them in the face of chronic violations.285
Indeed, substantial evidence suggests that Border Patrol simply ignores
the requirement altogether.
The result is the systematic violation of the constitutional rights of
citizens and non-citizens, documented and undocumented alike, which is
lent an unwarranted air of authority via the statute and regulation. Border
Patrol is extending its broad constitutional exemptions at the border into
its internal activities as well in what amounts to a sweeping exception to
the Fourth Amendment that is used for a broad array of law enforcement
purposes.
285. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (stating that if the
exclusionary rule does not apply in cases of Fourth Amendment violations, then “the
protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right . . . is of no value, and . . . might
as well be stricken from the Constitution”).
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
A few years ago, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont was stopped at a
Border Patrol checkpoint 125 miles from the border and was made to leave
his vehicle.286 He later proposed a measure to lessen the “reasonable
distance” for Border Patrol activity from 100 miles from the border to 25
miles.287 The bill passed the Senate288 but died in the House.289 In 2018,
Senator Leahy, along with Senator Patty Murray of Washington, again
introduced legislation to similarly limit Border Patrol authority to 25 miles
from the border rather than 100 miles. This bill would also restrict fixed
checkpoints to no more than 10 miles from the border, unless reasonable
suspicion of immigration violation existed. Additionally, the bill would
limit searches of private property without a warrant or probable cause to
10 miles (from the current 25 miles).290 The ACLU of Arizona has
proposed a similar approach.291
This approach of modifying the number of miles allowed for
circumscribed Fourth Amendment rights assumes, however, that it is
constitutionally appropriate for Congress to carve out exceptions to
particular amendments when it considers them to be prudent, efficient, or
otherwise helpful for law enforcement. If 25 miles is reasonable (or 100,
as the current law suggests), then why not 200 or 300 miles? Why not the
entire country? This would, presumably, increase the ability of Border
Patrol to seek out undocumented immigrants and border crossers.
Furthermore, if the government interests of “safety” and “security” are
sufficient to justify exceptions to rights for Border Patrol, then why not
apply that to all law enforcement agencies, in the interests of the same
safety and security? While Senator Leahy’s proposed 25 miles would
certainly represent an improvement over the current framework, it is by no
means a foregone conclusion that the agency should have any
286. See Todd Miller, Opinion, War on the Border, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/opinion/sunday/war-on-the-border.html; see also
Miller, supra note 61; Nixon, supra note 60.
287. Mark Davis, Leahy Seeks Answers from Homeland Security on Border
Checkpoints, VTDIGGER (Oct. 1, 2013), https://bit.ly/2msEnNP; Leahy Amendment To
Limit Border Zone Vehicle Stops And Searches of Private Land Is Included In New
Bipartisan Border Agreement, U.S. SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY (June 21, 2013),
https://bit.ly/2m6gmf3 (providing a press release on the Leahy-Murray plan).
288. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
H.R. 15, 113th Cong. (2013), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113thcongress/house-bill/15.
289. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/113thcongress/senate-bill/744.
290. However, the bill did not make it out of committee. Border Zone Reasonableness
Restoration Act of 2018, S. 3162, 115th Cong. (2018), available at https://bit.ly/372jFXb.
291. LYALL ET AL., supra note 48, at 17 (suggesting that Border Patrol activities be
limited to 25 miles from the border).
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constitutional exemptions at all. Allowing agents to board any vehicle,
even within 25 miles, clearly exceeds Fourth Amendment limitations
against warrantless searches and seizures.
The Constitution does not prohibit law enforcement operations; it
simply requires that they take place in a manner that reasonably protects
the rights of individuals. Although state and federal law enforcement
officers rely on a number of judicially-created exceptions to the warrant
requirement, those exceptions are at least ostensibly based on public health
and safety and weighty government interests. Border Patrol similarly
operates under the “border search exception,” where courts have weighed
the competing interests of border security and individual liberty in favor
of government interests. Border Patrol may conduct its operations in a
way that adheres to established constitutional requirements, but it simply
does not wish to do so. Allowing Border Patrol to operate beyond Fourth
Amendment restrictions in locations other than the border skews any
existing balance so far towards government intrusion that meaningful
individual liberties exist in name only when Border Patrol is involved. If
probable cause and warrants are acceptable limitations for state police
when searching for murderers and rapists, then it is difficult to see how
they are unacceptable when searching for people who have crossed a
national border without papers.
In addition, any exceptions to constitutional boundaries provided to
Border Patrol are rendered more problematic by the fact that the agency
and its employees do not appear to recognize or adhere to any restrictions
that currently exist, and regularly violate their own internal regulations as
well. Internal culture and external agency oversight are either nonexistent
or entirely impotent at both deterring and punishing agent misconduct.
Permitting any extra-constitutional behavior degrades constitutional rights
in such an environment of impunity.
Therefore, all Border Patrol activity that takes place anywhere other
than at the nation’s border should be bound by ordinary constitutional
restrictions applicable to all other law enforcement. This would mean that
all stops of all vehicles cannot take place without reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing. When city police stop a car based on reasonable suspicion, it
is typically a result of observing illegal behavior itself, such as speeding
or running a stop sign. Police stops that are based on more of a guess or a
hunch that the occupants are up to no good (or on the race of the occupants)
are unconstitutional and often successfully challenged in court because
they are not “reasonable.” Border Patrol, on the other hand, is not legally
permitted to stop vehicles for traffic violations; it may only make stops on
suspicion of immigration violations. But what observable action might
reasonably put a Border Patrol agent in suspicion of immigration
violations? He has almost certainly not observed an actual illegal border
crossing (in such a case, there would be no question as to his ability to
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conduct a stop). By its very nature, the Border Patrol stop will usually be
based on some sort of hunch, the reasonableness of which is subjective
and difficult to determine, and is often based on race, ethnic appearance,
or nothing at all. In practice, agents are granted considerable deference in
their assessments. But allowing Border Patrol to stop vehicles within the
interior of the country based on “reasonable suspicion” is inherently
problematic. To the extent they are permitted, “reasonable suspicion”
stops should be allowable under a narrow set of explicitly prescribed
circumstances, where specific and limited observable factors that are
statistically likely to be associated with recent illegal border crossings are
present.
Checkpoints are likewise problematic, and abundant evidence
suggests they are the location of significant rights violations and abuses.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that sobriety checkpoints are
constitutionally permissible,292 but general crime control checkpoints are
not.293 The Court also decided that administrative immigration
checkpoints are permissible, inasmuch as they entail brief questioning
about citizenship status.294 Any additional inspection, detention, and
questioning must be based on probable cause. Yet the same constitutional
violations are endemic here as with roving stops. What factor might cause
an agent to suspect that a person is not a citizen or a legal resident? There
may be some factors that are legitimate and statistically suspicious, but in
practice, if a white person without an accent answers that they are a U.S.
citizen, they are typically waved on, while others are significantly more
likely to be detained. Border Patrol themselves acknowledge that whether
a motorist is permitted through or pulled aside depends on the discretion
of the agent. It is not difficult to guess how that discretion is likely to play
out. This is substantiated by voluminous complaints and reports. But when
the individual is innocent, there is no recourse. When they are guilty, there
is little sympathy, and often still no recourse.295
However, the Court ruled that sobriety checkpoints are permissible
because they are of limited scope and are related specifically to one’s
ability to safely drive on public roads. Immigration checkpoints share no
such feature. As a result, their constitutionality is questionable. While their
operation may be less problematic if the specific requirements laid out by
the Court were adhered to, it is clear that those requirements are often
ignored. In addition, however, those requirements arguably do not solve
all of the constitutional issues at play. If immigration checkpoints are an
292. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451–52 (1990) (finding the
intrusion on motorists to be “slight” and therefore outweighed by the government interest
in reducing drunk driving).
293. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 32 (2000).
294. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976).
295. See supra Section IV.C.
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acceptable intrusion into constitutional rights due to the need to root out
undocumented immigrants, then the same question arises as to why not
conduct them everywhere? If the response is that they are more likely to
be effective nearer to the border, then the counter-argument is two-fold.
First, checkpoints empirically are ineffective at locating undocumented
immigrants at all. Second, and more importantly, constitutional rights do
not and cannot turn on how likely it might be that ignoring them might
enable law enforcement to catch wrongdoers.
Therefore, no internal immigration checkpoints should be permitted
at all. Law enforcement may not set up checkpoints to apprehend
criminals; CBP should not be permitted to do so either. Absent such a
change, the existence of internal checkpoints should be severely
circumscribed. To the extent that such checkpoints exist, they should be
permitted no more than ten miles from the border, as Senator Leahy
proposes, and should operate under the same “reasonable suspicion”
guidelines as laid out for roving stops. Suspicion that is based on race or
ethnicity should not be considered reasonable. Only a clearly defined list
of factors may justify additional questioning or searches, rather than
subjective feelings of individual agents, and documentation and evidence
must be consistently taken and maintained in order to avoid the unfettered
discretion and intrusions that are currently the norm. In other words, after
the initial citizenship/legal residence question, agents may not pull aside
anyone for detention and/or search based solely on some non-specific
suspicion. Requiring anything less would effectively make those of
Hispanic ethnicity or appearance perpetually subject to more government
intrusiveness and entitled to fewer constitutional rights, simply by virtue
of their ethnicity alone. This in no way comports with the requirements of
due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Certainly, CBP must also restructure its complaint and discipline
processes so that each is meaningful and effective rather than simply a
hollow pretense. Additionally, CBP must increase its transparency to
Congress and the public. There is no justifiable reason why CBP should
be permitted to remain so secretive in every aspect of its operations.
However, these things are complex problems in their own right and
warrant significantly more attention than can be provided here.
VII. CONCLUSION
The activities of Border Patrol have increasingly encroached into the
interior of the country and impact millions of people every year. The
agency’s methods and its lack of oversight keep much of the nation in a
surveillance state as part of an expansion of police powers that allows
constitutional rights to fall at the hands of government convenience,
oppressiveness, or tyranny. Although there have been pockets of outcries
in response, from policy-makers and the courts there seems to have been
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something of a collective shrug in the face of such corrosion of rights. If
the issues matter less because of the particular goals involved and/or the
relative lack of power of those who suffer the most, then there is reason to
believe that law enforcement actions violating Fourth Amendment rights
might eventually expand to include others. That is, after all, the way these
things tend to work. We are witnessing increasing government insertion
into the everyday lives of citizens as well as intrusion, suspicion, and
regular government questioning of everyone. This was precisely the sort
of thing the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent. With Border
Patrol, the Fourth Amendment is not working. What is now taking place
are the regular and systematic violations of the rights of the documented
and the undocumented, citizens and legal residents alike.
As a result of the apparent lack of restraint (both practical and legal)
of CBP and its employees, a fresh and critical analysis of the Border
Patrol’s internal activities is necessary. The “border search exception” has
become a circumvention of the Fourth Amendment, used for broad law
enforcement purposes beyond immigration law and in ways that regularly
trample upon constitutional provisions. Border Patrol’s use of immigration
checkpoints and roving patrols must be reconsidered and restructured,
with extensive limitations put into place with more of an eye toward the
Constitution than law enforcement desires. The 100-mile rule must be
eliminated, and courts should stop providing the rule any deference
whatsoever in a constitutional analysis properly considering the Fourth
Amendment. CBP’s oversight system must be more than internal selfregulation, which is clearly ineffective. Rather, that system must involve
clear guidelines, deference to constitutional rights, strong external
oversight that includes meaningful enforcement and real consequences for
misconduct, as well as transparency to Congress and to the public.
Anything less would be a disservice to the nation, its people, and its
governing principles.

